The position of a government inspection agency overseeing public services, such as the Education Inspectorate, lies in the relationship between principals and agents. The principal is the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science (OCW), and the agents are the school boards. To monitor whether they perform their duties satisfactorily, the Education Inspectorate oversees the schools. If the principal cannot directly monitor the work of the agents, provisions are necessary. Inspection services serve as such a provision. They assess whether the agents are indeed delivering the public services. To maintain effective and efficient oversight, it is necessary to measure results against intended goals using indicators. These indicators should, at the lowest possible cost, provide as much insight as possible into the (risks of) achieving the set goals, while simultaneously causing as few side effects as possible in the actions of the agent. This section begins with the theoretical framework for the execution of oversight. Then, three studies examine how certain risk indicators function and what effects and side effects can be expected. The section concludes with a description of the practical application of the findings and general points of discussion. This article is a summary of the author’s dissertation.
